



# General Assembly

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### **Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects**

### **Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations**

## **Global field support strategy**

### **Report of the Secretary-General**

#### *Summary*

Protecting and nurturing a fragile peace is a critical role of the United Nations. This endeavour depends upon a coalition of will and action on the part of multiple actors: the Security Council, in terms of setting mandates; the Member States, in their commitment of personnel and financial and material resources; the host countries, and their consent and cooperation; and the Secretariat and its own ability to stand up, support and sustain operations.

Within this framework, the Department of Field Support was created to be primarily responsible for the mobilization all human, material and support services necessary to ensure that United Nations field missions are largely self-sufficient and can succeed under a wide range of post-conflict conditions. Today, the typical field environment is remote, austere and, increasingly, dangerous, sometimes openly hostile to a United Nations presence. In such settings, lines of communications (for support and sustainment) are often long and subject to frequent and extended natural and man-made disruptions. Local markets for goods and services are limited or non-existent, and the rule of law can be tenuous or wholly absent. Moreover, potable water is scarce and in high demand, fresh food can be difficult to procure in quantity, housing stock is frequently in short supply, and reliable communications infrastructure is lacking.



## Challenges

The Department of Field Support currently provides logistics, administrative and information and communications technology support for 32 peacekeeping and field-based special political missions, including to the African Union Mission in Somalia. These field missions represent a total civilian, police and military deployment of more than 139,000 personnel. In the case of support for peacekeeping missions, the constant rate of troop and police rotations entails supporting twice the number of deployed uniformed personnel on an annual basis.

The response to the challenges posed by the scale and scope of current field mission deployments must be considered in the light of the demands that the development of peacekeeping as foreseen will bring. In this connection, the broader political and operational challenges in the area of peacekeeping are set out in the “New Horizon” non-paper, which outlines the challenges facing United Nations peacekeeping operations and proposes a process of dialogue with Member States that will serve as a basis for promoting innovation, flexibility and accountability in support systems. The “New Horizon” non-paper, building on the seminal analysis contained in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809) — the Brahimi report of 2000 — stresses that: “Each new operation is built voluntarily and from scratch on the assumption that adequate resources can be found and is run on individual budget, support and administrative lines. Peacekeeping in its current form requires more predictable, professional and adaptable capacities. It needs a global system to match the global enterprise it has become.”

While peacekeeping missions are tasked primarily with providing security and stability, the design and implementation of timely peacebuilding strategies can facilitate a responsible transition and exit. The support perspective must therefore consider the need for seamless transitions between peacekeeping and special political missions. The successive field missions in Sierra Leone and Burundi are examples of such transitions.

Any analysis of support problems must address the fact that, during a mission’s life cycle, mandates and operational demands evolve according to developments on the ground. Also, missions differ significantly in their level of integration, size, type and mandate. Rapid mission deployment is fundamental to supporting mandate implementation. When a mission is mandated, there is a political opportunity in terms of agreement both by Security Council members on actions to be taken and by the host country Government and the parties in dispute. Delaying start-up or underestimating the support challenges could cause such an opportunity to be lost. In addition, missions in a mature state of operations are frequently unable to retain talented staff, a reality that can hinder the Organization’s ability to achieve a viable steady state.

Many factors determine the success of a support operation, including effectiveness and transparency in the use of resources. From the point of view of those being served, however, speed and quality are two of the most critical dimensions. Unfortunately, either or both of these attributes have all too often been absent — resulting in a direct impact on the credibility of United Nations intervention and the professional standing of the Organization. The need to achieve a better balance and performance in this regard is the major impetus for the development of a global field support strategy.

### **The global field support strategy**

The overall intention of this proposed global field support strategy is to transform service delivery to field missions. It is designed as an integrated comprehensive programme that draws on the lessons learned from several decades of operational experience. The strategy is designed to achieve four core, operationally focused objectives and two objectives that consider the impact of field missions' deployment footprints:

The core objectives are to:

- (a) Expedite and improve support for peacekeeping, including critical early peacebuilding;
- (b) Expedite and improve support for peacemaking, electoral assistance, mediation support and conflict prevention;
- (c) Strengthen resource stewardship and accountability while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale;
- (d) Improve the safety and living conditions of staff.

The mission impact objectives are to:

- (a) Fully utilize local and regional investment and capacity;
- (b) Reduce the in-country environmental impact of peacekeeping and field-based special political missions.

A piecemeal approach is not an option. The strategy brings to the consideration of Member States key proposed changes aimed at improving the full spectrum of service delivery, on the one hand providing fast, complete and flexible support to the civilian, police and military components deployed in the field, and, on the other, ensuring cost efficiencies and transparency.

A new global service-delivery model is proposed. It foresees, in a departure from existing practice, a fundamental shift in the existing division of labour and a relocation of functions to improve responsiveness and better address the needs of the field missions. The intention is that:

- The Secretariat would continue to set strategic direction, exercise oversight and take policy decisions, but get out of the business of operational and transactional service delivery
- Global and regional service centres would take over the majority of operational and transactional functions
- The mission support component of field operations would thereby be reduced, with only location-dependent activities performed in specific mission locations

On the basis of these overarching principles, the strategy would have four distinct but integrated components:

- (a) The creation of global and regional service centres, including, in the first instance, reprofiling the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, and the existing Support Base in Entebbe, Uganda, as a shared service centre for missions in the region;

(b) The establishment of deployment modules in order to improve the speed and predictability of the deployment of the military, police and civilian components of field missions, particularly in start-up or surge operations;

(c) The modification of mission financing arrangements so as to expedite the timely deployment of material and human resources to missions;

(d) The reinforcement of response capacities, a deliberate approach to securing external and building internal civilian capacities, including stand-by arrangements with contractors, military support capacities, short-term consultants and individual contractors, rapidly deployable standing and stand-by capacities, including senior-level positions and highly specialized functions, and rosters of capable and rapidly deployable capacities.

In addition to achieving greater levels of efficiency and effectiveness, this new delivery model will have important effects in terms of reducing mission footprints and risk exposure, improving safety and security and bettering living conditions for civilian support staff, which, in turn, will promote a higher rate of retention and increased productivity.

Too many reform initiatives have failed owing to a lack of sustained and dedicated attention in the implementation phase. Member States are therefore requested to endorse several specific measures and adaptations to the existing regulatory framework in order to facilitate implementation of the strategy, along with the approval of dedicated change-management resources.

Change will not happen overnight. The agenda is complex and requires a shift in existing attitudes and practices. It also demands close collaboration between the General Assembly and the various elements within the Secretariat in the field and at Headquarters. For that reason, a five-year implementation horizon is foreseen.

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## **I. The need for change**

1. A global approach to support operations is intended to maximize economies of scale and allow for an overarching evaluation of priorities, on the basis of an understanding of the broad resource implications and possible trade-offs. Peacekeeping and special political missions<sup>1</sup> are, by definition, operating in high-risk environments where the window to effect changes is narrow. While rapid deployment is fundamental to the achievement of mandates, it is strongly dependent on the response time of support components, including in terms of the fast procurement of goods and services and the immediate availability of staff, both of which require optimized resource management.

### **Critical support challenges**

#### **1. Mission mandates must be informed by support needs and capabilities**

2. Support functions (including in the areas of human resources, finance, logistics, communications and information technology, administrative/general management issues and procurement) are strategic enablers allowing the Organization to successfully mount and sustain field missions. As was the case recently with regard to Chad and Darfur, deployment benchmarks have been established without fully taking into consideration the excessively difficult environment for mission deployment (such as gaps in transportation infrastructure and limited sources of specialized human and material resources).

#### **2. Availability of sufficient financial resources for initial mission deployment**

3. Financial regulation 4.6 restricts the individual approval limit for commitment authority to \$50 million and the aggregate to the value of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund. The limit of \$50 million per individual commitment may no longer be relevant in the context of large missions, some of which have annual budgets of close to \$1 billion or more. Because that amount includes the replenishment of strategic deployment stocks, there is very little flexibility to fund critical programmes while approval of the mission budget is pending.

#### **3. Capacity of the United Nations to deploy civilian, military and police personnel rapidly and effectively**

##### **(a) Delivery of material resources**

4. The ability to expedite the delivery of material resources to new and expanding missions on a timely basis remains a major challenge. The value of procurement for peacekeeping operations has significantly increased in recent years, reaching \$2.73 billion in 2008 (86 per cent of all Secretariat procurement). Current procedures guiding the procurement process provide for little differentiation between meeting the procurement needs of Headquarters, which are usually predictable compared with those of field missions, whose requirements are dynamic in nature and time-sensitive.

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this document, unless otherwise specified, all field presences supported by the Department of Field Support are referred to as field missions.

**(b) Personnel**

5. With respect to civilian staff, high international staff vacancy rates, averaging 29 per cent,<sup>2</sup> and an average turnover rate of 27 per cent<sup>3</sup> per year have a direct impact on the effectiveness of mission mandate implementation. Despite having appointed 1,733 staff in the 2008/09 budget cycle, the Organization is contending with a notable loss rate of staff. For complex missions such as the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the rate stands at approximately 43 per cent of total appointments for the same period. The inability to attract, recruit and retain high-quality personnel for United Nations field missions relates in great part to the fact that mission staff members operate in some of the harshest, most dynamic and dangerous operational environments. The human resources reforms approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 63/250, which streamline contractual arrangements, provide greater career opportunities and job security for field staff. With more than half of the Secretariat staff serving in the field, this measure will better position the Organization to manage its human resources so as to fulfil the mandates given by Member States. However, the issue of compensation for maintaining a separate residence for family members outside non-family missions remains to be addressed.

**(c) Support for military and police deployments**

6. Many factors contribute to the challenges faced in the area of mandate implementation. In particular, the generation of military and police contributions from Member States is being affected by the increasing political and security challenges facing missions and peacekeepers. The difficulties experienced by Member States and the Secretariat in meeting requirements and managing concerns over cost also have an impact on the ability of missions to reach their mandated strengths.

7. The Organization must strike a balance between the demand for effective delivery and the requirement to comply with United Nations financial regulations and rules. The adequacy of entitlements, including reimbursement entitlements and procedures for troop and police contributors, must also be considered. Just as it is unacceptable to use operational demands to justify shortcuts, it is unacceptable to utilize the existing frameworks without questioning their continued applicability and, where relevant, seeking the appropriate empowerment to do a better job. Quite often, support operations are hindered by processes and conditions that have not been reviewed for a long time or have not been approached with the flexibility to accommodate the current realities on the ground and the fast-paced operational tempos of some missions. Some of the requirements that currently determine the way uniformed contingent personnel are accommodated may hinder support for the operational needs of some peacekeeping missions. The need for long-range patrols in missions with large areas of responsibility, for example, can be hampered by

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<sup>2</sup> Data as at 30 June 2009.

<sup>3</sup> Average turnover rate in field missions supported by the Department of Field Support, July 2008 through June 2009.

uncertainty on the part of troop and police contributors as well as within the mission regarding entitlements to and responsibilities for the provision of hard-wall accommodation. In such instances, a flexible approach is required that includes the utilization of high-quality tents provided by the United Nations for use under such circumstances. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations will reconvene its Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment in 2011, which will address a number of technical and procedural concerns with respect to reimbursement and self-sustainment. Discussions in the context of the New Horizon non-paper could envisage more strategic changes to the contingent-owned equipment system.

#### **4. Safety and security of staff**

8. Many of the newer missions, such as those in Chad, the Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq, operate at extreme levels of sensitivity, visibility and risk, with complex mandates to assist in the processes of State restoration and State-building. A changing climate towards United Nations presence is evidenced by the fact that at times factions outside the peace process target United Nations personnel. Such challenges are further exacerbated by the increased danger posed by organized crime (including kidnappings). Security caps for mission deployment of staff in turn affect mission implementation capacities. Civilian personnel retention rates are affected. The support and active engagement of Member States regarding their commitment in terms of police and military deployments is also affected by safety and security challenges. These can lead to mounting strain on their Governments as they face public pressures not to deploy or to withdraw.

#### **5. Improved support for peacekeeping transition and exit strategies**

9. The evolution of peacekeeping has entailed a shift from a primary reliance on essentially military functions to monitor border agreements to the implementation of complex mandates. Increasingly, the Organization has been called upon to operate in States that are emerging from civil strife. It has also been requested to rebuild institutions of governance and security and to address a breakdown in the rule of law. As outlined in the New Horizon agenda, peacekeeping transition and exit strategies are dependent on countries assuming responsibility for their own security. As the Organization moves to improve its contribution to attaining that goal, support elements must be prepared to provide the type of administrative and logistics support required by rule of law and security sector reform components. In addition, the transition from a peacekeeping presence to a special political mission necessitates appropriate interaction with the host Government, civil society and the broader United Nations system. It presents its own set of support challenges, be they staffing, material or financial management. The requirement for specialized support is particularly important, as transitions must be seamless as far as support components performance is concerned.

#### **6. Optimizing the use of global resources**

10. One of the shortcomings identified in terms of the support delivery mechanisms is the fact that each mandate is unique, a reality that, in effect, every new mission must confront as if for the first time. In each case, an on-the-ground assessment must be conducted and a budget prepared in accordance with the Security Council mandate. A fully justified staffing table must be devised and the critical and necessary equipment identified, prepared, inspected and transported to



the mission areas. Appropriate memorandums of understanding and letters of assist must be negotiated, and forces must be identified, prepared and deployed. Land for housing and mission operations must be secured and improved, contracts for every product and every service, from gravel to aircraft operations, must be negotiated. International staff must be attracted and recruited, and local staff must be identified and hired. For these reasons, the process of planning, mounting and deploying a new operation can take, on average, from 6 to 12 months. While it is daunting enough to carry out these tasks even once, an important and complicating factor in field support has been the requirement to start and/or expand several missions simultaneously. Given the multiple political, managerial and operational challenges in field, it is necessary to evolve from managing support to individual missions as independent entities to managing a global support operation. Such an approach is intended to maximize economies of scale and allow for an overarching evaluation of priorities on the basis of an understanding of the broad resource implications and possible trade-offs.

11. With the strategy, the Organization is for the first time approaching field mission support as an integrated whole, with a specific focus on implementation. This comprehensive approach involves moving forward from investing in singular elements of human resources, financial management, logistics or information and communications technology support through the adoption of a more global approach. This integrated approach is aimed at supporting mandate implementation by field missions and at actively engaging United Nations peacekeeping and field-based special political missions' implementation partners, both at Headquarters and in the field. Underpinning the support strategy, therefore, is an operational management approach that moves away from the stovepipe approach to project management by engaging the senior leadership of implementation partners.

#### **7. Partnerships with regional organizations**

12. Regional organizations have, over the past decade, planned, deployed and conducted peacekeeping operations under a United Nations mandate in various contexts and forms. Recent examples include the United Nations working in partnership with the African Union in Darfur and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as succeeding a European Union military operation in Chad and handing over policing operations to the European Union in Kosovo. Those experiences have made it clear that the respective organizations' different administrative procedures and structures create obstacles to effective operational cooperation. Through increased knowledge of the structures of the various organizations, joint evaluations and lessons learned, the experience of cooperation in a given context can be built on in order to allow for more effective operational cooperation in future.

## **II. The plan for change**

13. The strategy seeks to consolidate the Organization's capacity to support multidimensional, varied field missions and to adapt, in a flexible manner, to their expansion or contraction. The distinguishing characteristic of such a support structure will be its ability to calibrate its support model to the multiple dimensions of each field mission and to related needs at the global and regional levels.

14. The goal of the plan for change in the provision of support to field missions is to deliver timely, high-quality integrated services to missions. That will translate into missions that are deployed faster, that afford maximum safety and security for civilian, military and police personnel from the start, that provide staff with improved quality of life while on mission and that have a reduced environmental impact while utilizing fully local and regional capacities.

15. To achieve the goal of timely deployment, the Organization must ensure that there are sufficient financial and human resources to support mandate implementation. Deployment schedules must deliver quality staff so as to allow for an appropriate exchange of information between Headquarters and missions (intra- and inter-mission). In addition, to ensure effective mission leadership, a new approach is required to the recruiting, training and support of senior leadership with the goal of achieving improved gender balance, obtaining the right oversight and strengthening performance management so as to increase accountability.

16. The plan for change builds upon three interrelated components:

(a) Strengthened resource management frameworks, providing improved financial models to expedite the timely deployment of material and human resources;

(b) Service centres, with the optimal placement of service-delivery sources, designed to combine material resources and enabling capabilities to deliver predefined modules for goods and services;

(c) An integrated human resources framework, to ensure the predictability and adaptability of human capacities and the timely delivery of human resources services.

17. The plan includes an operational management system aimed at ensuring the implementation of the plan, as well as change management and quality assurance/risk management components.

## **A. Operating assumptions of the support model**

18. The strategy foresees a reinforced division of labour and the relocation of functions on the basis of the following overarching principles:

(a) The Secretariat will continue to set the strategic direction, exercise oversight and take policy decisions;

(b) Global and regional service centres will undertake operational and transactional functions;

(c) Location-dependent activities will continue to be performed in-mission.

19. The Department of Field Support headquarters team will concentrate on the following aspects:

(a) Support strategy definition, in conjunction with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs;

(b) Policy and standard definition, in conjunction with the Department of Management and the Office of Information and Communications Technology;

- (c) High-level global managerial oversight of operations;
- (d) Training and capacity-building, in conjunction with the Office of Human Resources Management;
- (e) Resource stewardship and reporting;
- (f) All possible ways and means of enabling field missions to fulfil mandate requirements.

20. The integrated operational teams will continue to play a role in ensuring that the multidimensional aspects of support to a mission are addressed and in providing the appropriate political guidance and following up with the specialized functional areas when they are better placed to take action, monitor developments and integrate or coordinate the input from partners. The Department of Field Support headquarters team will interact with the integrated operational teams to meet those objectives.

21. With respect to global and regional service centre teams, the support model will relocate support teams closer to the area where the recipients of the services are located. This will minimize or eliminate problems relating to time-zone differences, decrease overall response time to service requests and facilitate the flow of information. Also, field mission requirements will be more easily understood and identified with the help of a support-focused team located in the same region serviced by a given mission.

22. The support model also will integrate support teams from various missions to support a region. This will increase the availability of skilled staff and afford economies of scale. These changes will be implemented through the service centre concept.<sup>4</sup>

23. Concerning in-mission support teams, the support teams responsible for delivering day-to-day support services that require the presence of the recipient of the service at the moment the transaction is performed will continue to be located in-mission. Such location-dependent transactions include such activities as cash management and equipment support services.

24. The focus on the specialization of support functions will allow for optimized service delivery through the delegation of specific responsibilities, clearer lines of accountability for service delivery and a rationalization of roles and capabilities. It is important to note that the proposed support model does not change the reporting and collaborative frameworks or organizational structures, responsibilities and relationships of Secretariat implementing partners.

25. Within this context, it is important to stress that the delegation of authority remains an important element that ensures that the Controller can delegate financial authority, on a personal basis, to counterparts with financial responsibility, be it at peacekeeping missions or at other entities under the authority of the Secretary-General. As the Organization moves towards implementation of the enterprise resource planning system (Umoja), certain financial functions may be built into the system that redefine approval processes and procedures. However, the Controller, as

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<sup>4</sup> The service centre concept is already implemented in some United Nations agencies, funds and programmes; the Secretariat will capitalize on their experiences and lessons learned, in particular the experiences of the World Health Organization service centre in Kuala Lumpur and the World Food Programme centres in Dubai and New Delhi.

certifying officer of the financial statements of the Organization, remains accountable for the overall management of the Organization's financial matters.

## **B. Benefits of the support model**

26. **Quality of support services for field missions.** Benefits include an increased focus on strategic issues, performance monitoring and resource stewardship at Headquarters; a concentration and availability of specialists; a concentration and increased availability of tools and facilities; an increased possibility of delegation; and the optimal placement of service providers.

27. **Rapid deployment.** A deployable serving staff matched to and trained to assume the critical functions that have been identified will be available at the service centres. The standing police capacity at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi is an example of such a capability.

28. **Efficient use of global resources for field missions.** The benefits of the model are economies of scale; reduced mission footprints; local and regional capacity-building, where economically viable; and diversification of suppliers.

29. **Staff involved in support activities.** Benefits include improved living and working conditions as a result of the service centres being located at family duty stations; mitigated security risks due to a reduction in mission footprint; and improved capacity to strengthen opportunities for career development and learning, as well as strategic planning, outreach and succession management systems, aimed at building and developing a capable, adept, agile, high-quality civilian workforce.

30. The strategy fully acknowledges the importance of building on lessons learned from partnerships with regional organizations. For example, efforts are currently under way to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat to address issues of mutual concern to the United Nations and the African Union. Such lessons and experiences are also highly relevant to United Nations cooperation with other regional organizations.

31. The Secretary-General's report of 18 September 2009 on support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (A/64/359-S/2009/470) underscored the importance of the strategic relationship between the United Nations and the African Union and outlined a number of concrete actions to be taken to strengthen that partnership and address the requirements of the African Union as it develops its peacekeeping capacity (in particular for personnel training, focusing on those areas dealing with financial and human resources administration, logistics and information and communications technology). The proposed new field support model is intended to allow for the effective and efficient fulfilment of this requirement in part through the creation of service centres. This model will further develop all areas of support so as to assist and enable the African Union and other regional organizations acting in partnership to effectively plan, manage, deploy and liquidate their peacekeeping operations. In addition, lessons learned from the recent experience of providing logistical and administrative support to the African Union Mission in Somalia will also inform the strategy's implementation plan.

### **III. Strengthened resource management frameworks**

32. Given that there have been significant increases in recent years in the size and complexity of field operations, the cost-effective and efficient stewardship of available resources is more important than ever before. Peacekeeping operations, including the operations of the United Nations Logistics Base, are expected to cost more than \$7.5 billion in the 2009/10 budget year, having grown each year from \$2.5 billion in 2003/04. The combined annual budget of \$536 million approved for 2010 for special political missions supported by the Department of Field Support represents a more than tenfold increase from 2003 levels.

33. The growth of the peacekeeping portfolio has been accompanied by an increase in unused funding each year, peaking with a combined “underspend” in 2007/08 of \$486 million, or 7.5 per cent of funding approved for the year. That has been significantly reduced for 2008/09, with expenditure for the year being \$193 million, or 2.6 per cent, less than approved budgets for the year.

34. As part of the growing portfolio of field operations, a number of major new operational undertakings in recent years have emphasized the imperative of establishing mechanisms to rapidly identify and mobilize the required resources and secure associated financing.

35. Within this overall context, the resource management strategy is aimed at improving support to field operations with respect to three core pillars:

- (a) Enhancing strategic resource management;
- (b) Optimizing existing resourcing models;
- (c) Strengthening management and oversight systems.

#### **A. Enhancing strategic resource management**

36. The scale and complexity of the missions supported by the Department of Field Support, each with its own funding source, has resulted in a tendency towards operational resource management with a focus at the mission level and on each individual mission.

37. A refocusing at Headquarters on a global approach offers a broad opportunity to simplify systems, avoid duplication with field operations, ensure consistency in best practices, prioritize efforts in areas of critical importance and achieve economies of scale in resourcing requirements. Such an approach would draw on best practices from other areas within the United Nations system and would include a focus on defining annual resourcing priorities across all peacekeeping operations and special political missions; developing and implementing global resourcing standards and benchmarks; reinforcing support to resource mobilization efforts; and periodically performing, on a rotating basis, major resourcing reviews of each mission, with a focus on benchmarking, the cost-effective allocation of resources and alignment with mandates.

## **B. Optimizing existing resourcing models**

38. Although operational circumstances and location-based factors will always dictate differences in resourcing requirements in separate field operations, the global field support strategy is intended to support a more homogeneous approach to mission support requirements wherever possible. A key focus for the strategy in this regard will be on the different stages of the typical life cycle of a mission. Fittingly, initial work with respect to these requirements will include the start-up (or expansion) of major field operations. In the ensuing stages of the implementation of the strategy, similar measures will be examined in terms of establishing more standardized resourcing requirements and best practices in subsequent phases of the typical life of a major United Nations field operation.

## **C. Strengthening management and oversight systems**

39. The financial and management environment for United Nations field operations has changed significantly since many of the current management and control practices were established. In that regard, the increasing resourcing requirements of United Nations field operations have matched the growth in the risks and complexity of operations.

40. The success of major United Nations field operations requires empowerment in the field for those best placed to make informed decisions in a timely manner. Such flexibility must, in turn, be complemented by strengthened management and oversight.

41. With field operations accounting for three quarters of annual expenditure by the Secretariat, the full introduction of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and the Umoja enterprise resource planning system are essential in order to improve the way in which field resources are managed and controlled, support for decision-making and transparency in reporting. It is a priority of the strategy to ensure that peacekeeping business processes will be IPSAS-and Umoja-compliant.

## **D. Initial steps: funding the establishment of new or expanding missions**

42. The Secretary-General has since 1995 had the authority, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to enter into expenditure commitments of up to \$50 million<sup>5</sup> for the initial establishment or expansion of any individual peacekeeping operation. This is funded from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund,<sup>6</sup> which was initially established in the amount of \$150 million. Where requirements exceed \$50 million, or several “commitment authorities” combined total more than \$150 million at any one time, the approval of the General Assembly is required.

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<sup>5</sup> The commitment limits were established in General Assembly 49/233 A.

<sup>6</sup> The Peacekeeping Reserve Fund was established by resolution 47/217.

43. Since the financial modalities of new and expanding missions were last considered by the General Assembly, the Organization has worked to establish and expand a number of significant peacekeeping operations. An analysis of the start-up in recent years of UNMIS, UNAMID, MINURCAT and the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) highlights concerns related to the establishment of new missions within the time frames often expected by Member States. While the underlying challenges in this regard revolve around logistics, technology and personnel requirements, it is critical that current funding mechanisms, unchanged for 15 years, be updated to match the improvements envisaged in terms of deploying mission resources in a timely manner.

44. The recent start-up of UNSOA provides an example of the current challenges experienced in the process of responding rapidly to a new mandate. There were numerous interim arrangements and it was not until two months after the adoption of the mandate that any expenditure authority was made available, and a full-year budget was approved after 11 months. My existing authority of \$50 million was insufficient to provide for the first four months of UNSOA operations, despite the fact that it is a more limited operation than the majority of current peacekeeping missions.

45. Concerns have also been raised in recent years with respect to the establishment of UNMIS, UNAMID and MINURCAT, including the lengthy processes (involving multiple funding proposals) of funding initial operations, the modest size of the Secretary-General's authority compared to the cost of modern operations, the temporary use of funding from other missions, and the lack of clarity of resourcing requirements.

46. The Office of Internal Oversight Services has also raised concerns, noting that "the limit of \$50 million [available to the Secretary-General] may no longer be relevant in the context of large missions, some of which have annual budgets of close to \$1 billion or more. Furthermore, the amount includes replenishment of strategic deployment stocks, thereby leaving very little flexibility to fund critical programmes while approval of the mission budget is pending" (A/60/717, para. 33). The following year, the Office stated in the same context that: "The insufficiency of the pre-mandate commitment authority may preclude the timely establishment of proper organizational and reporting structures needed to effectively manage Department of Peacekeeping Operations and field missions, in terms of the segregation of functions and the recruitment of key personnel" (A/61/743, para. 43).

47. The strategy proposes to implement a number of initiatives aimed at improving the framework for the General Assembly to approve resourcing requirements for a new or expanding field operation and to provide the necessary financing.

## **1. Approval of resources for new operations**

48. A standardized resourcing model for new or expanding field operations would provide reassurances to the General Assembly in addressing a number of current concerns:

(a) Resources could be rapidly mobilized to initiate operational implementation;

(b) Approval of resources for a reasonable period of up to one year would provide the operational planning and certainty critical to establishing a complex new operation;

(c) The initial staffing of a new mission could remain focused on operational planning and execution, rather than on detailed funding development;

(d) A focus on the resources that can be deployed in this initial period, rather than the mission's full functional requirements, would facilitate a standardized approach and ensure a closer alignment between approved funding and actual expenditure.

49. This approach to approving a standardized funding model is intended to reflect a more homogeneous approach to operational support requirements, in particular in the early stages of a mission, when the deployment of resources is limited by what can be achieved initially. A standardized budget model will provide a funding base that is comparable to actual resourcing requirements but subject to variances in actual implementation. Actual expenditure would be reported to the General Assembly at the end of the period.

50. To maximize the effectiveness of this approach in rapidly securing funding, it is envisaged that a standardized funding model would be developed in detail for pre-approval by the General Assembly, with periodical updates and review. The assurances provided by this preapproved model would support the granting of greater financing authority to the Secretary-General for the mandated establishment or expansion of peacekeeping operations, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for each instance of its execution and financing.

## **2. Financing of new operations**

51. The current authority of the Secretary-General to enter into expenditure commitments of up to \$50 million (with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) to establish or expand a peacekeeping operation, and the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund of \$150 million were established 15 years ago, when the combined annual budget of peacekeeping operations was a fraction of its current level.

52. In recent years, new and expanding missions have frequently needed higher funding requirements in their initial period of operation, with a "commitment authority with assessment" (involving detailed consideration by the General Assembly) frequently being called upon.

53. This has involved extensive efforts and a lengthy time lag, and in each case the limits of the existing funding mechanisms have restricted the duration of the initial funding period. The establishment of a preapproved resourcing model provides the added assurances that may allow the General Assembly to finance the period of up to one year that would provide reasonable certainty for the planning and execution of a complex operation.

54. Two measures, combined with the added assurances of a preapproved resourcing model, could allow the General Assembly to provide the Secretary-General with the increased authority necessary without calling for new funding from Member States.



55. I propose that, where warranted, the Secretary-General be able to call upon, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the full balance of up to \$150 million of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund in entering into financial commitments for the establishment or expansion of any individual peacekeeping operation.

56. The United Nations strategic deployment stocks, managed by the Department of Field Support, were also established,<sup>7</sup> initially at a level of \$141,546,000 in equipment and materials, to support the rapid implementation or expansion of peacekeeping operations. Present arrangements call for any mission receiving such stores to be charged their costs, effectively necessitating that they be charged against an approved commitment authority granted to the Secretary-General in the case of new or expanding missions. The fact that the use of strategic deployment stocks in such circumstances is currently limited to an amount with the financing available from the commitment authority against the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund has the potential to negate the objective of the strategic deployment stocks to mitigate delays in the deployment and implementation of a new or expanded mission.

57. I therefore propose that, where warranted, the Secretary-General be able to seek, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, commitment authority for a new or expanded mission, to draw up to the full amount of stores available under the strategic deployment stocks, in addition to the commitments financed from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, and that replenishment of the stores so drawn occur only if sufficient funding is available to finance a new or expanding mission. This is similar to the current arrangements for drawdown and replenishment of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund. As soon as budget estimates specific to the new or expanded mission are sufficiently clear, a proposed new or revised budget will be submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration and decision on appropriation and assessment.

58. If agreed, these two measures would enable the Secretary-General to establish commitment authority for a new or expanding mission and, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, resourced separately from the balances available in both the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks. That would have the effect of allowing the Secretary-General to draw upon the Organization's existing reserves, composed of cash and stores of up to approximately \$300 million (the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks), without calling on new contingency financing from Member States.

#### **IV. Service centres**

59. The strategy proposes that two different types of service centres be established: a global service centre and regional service centres. Staffing of the service centres would be achieved mainly through redeployments from Department of Field Support headquarters and from missions.

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<sup>7</sup> The concept of strategic deployment stocks was created by the General Assembly in its resolution 56/292.

60. It is intended that the global service centre will consolidate service packages for global delivery. The operational teams with global service delivery responsibility will be established throughout the five years of the strategy's implementation, with existing resources strengthened by the relocation of posts from Department of Field Support headquarters. The global service centre will also deliver predefined modules for goods and services at the global level.

61. The regional service centres will deliver services at the regional level through operational support teams responsible for providing day-to-day support services that do not require the presence of the recipient of the service at the moment the transaction is performed. The operational teams with regional service delivery responsibility will be established throughout the five years of the strategy's implementation, mainly through the relocation of posts from the missions it serves. That will, among other benefits, ensure that the regional service centres have a high capacity to increase or reduce their size based on the missions' cycles. When a mission is closed, for example, its contribution to the regional service centre servicing it ceases, and the size of the service centre is reduced accordingly.

62. The strategy proposes the creation of one regional service centre in Entebbe that will serve missions in the Great Lakes region during the first year of implementation. It is envisaged that, subject to requirements, the establishment of additional service centres in other geographic locations may be advantageous, subject to the carrying out of the appropriate cost-benefit analysis and feasibility assessment. In that case, and on the basis of the experience gained in Entebbe, the need and justification for and the description of the newly proposed centres would be presented for Member States' consideration.

63. Service centres will serve two main goals: to deliver predefined modules for goods and services, which are critical enablers for rapid deployment; and to host the operational support teams responsible for delivering day-to-day support services.

64. Concerning predefined modules for goods and services, the strategy is mission-focused and seeks to create service-delivery packages that meet field deployment requirements on missions' terms. The need to provide safe, appropriate living and working facilities, for example, will be addressed as a "service package", as opposed to a series of discrete services (project budget allocation, procurement, engineering design, labour, etc.), which require integration at the mission level and by mission staff. Service packages will align equipment with enabling capacities, provide scalability and flexibility to adapt to changing realities on the ground, and be self-sustainable and environmentally efficient. Building on lessons learned in the area of deployment, the Secretariat will develop a menu of modular solutions that will combine equipment with enablers to arrive at service packages to meet mission needs.

65. This long-term goal for service packages will be implemented in stages. The work of modularizing certain functions into service packages and establishing product sheets and usage instructions will be launched through a review of the strategic deployment stocks and the systems contracts that are currently available. Subsequent to this review, development will be undertaken of the first product sheets and service packages for security perimeters, black- and grey-water waste-management systems, camp waste-management systems, pre-engineered steel buildings, headquarters and sector headquarters green-field templates, inter alia.

66. In updating these modalities, the Secretariat will benefit the development of regional and local economies. In matching up equipment with the enabling human resources for mission support, an optimal array of contractual, vendor-provided and/or United Nations capacity will be utilized.

67. Special attention will be paid to supporting the deployment of military and police contingents through the inclusion of military/police pattern equipment (i.e., inclusion in the strategic deployment stocks self-sustainment category), to be developed in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and troop- and police-contributing countries experts.

68. The global service packages will be configured and managed from the global service centre. This will be an organizing principle. Regional service centres could, in turn, develop region-specific service packages and/or focus on the regional delivery of global service packages.

69. Operational support teams will be responsible for delivering day-to-day support services. The strategy seeks to consolidate routine back-office administrative and support functions (in the areas of human resources, administration, logistics, finance, information and communications technology, regional training and regional field procurement) from geographically grouped field missions into a stand-alone centre whose main function is to deliver services to field missions in the region. As a general principle, the regional service centres should be located so as to maximize the benefits derived from physical proximity to the field missions they serve (i.e., shared time zones and minimum travel time and costs to missions).

#### **A. Global service centre**

70. During the strategy's five-year implementation horizon, the investments already made in the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi will be leveraged. The Logistics Base will be reprofiled as the global service centre for the field. While the Base will continue to perform its current tasks as the logistics base for United Nations peacekeeping (including the provision of logistics and information and communications technology support, and maintaining the strategic deployment stocks reserve), it will be further developed to support centres of expertise for service delivery to the field in the following areas: administrative support, field central review body secretariat services, budgeting and financial management. Moreover, the concept of modularization will widen the scope of strategic deployment stocks and add effectiveness to its current operation.

71. The United Nations Support Base at Valencia, Spain, will serve as a communications hub for peace operations as well as a secondary active site for disaster recovery.

#### **B. Entebbe regional service centre**

72. In order to leverage existing investments, the strategy envisages the utilization of the existing capabilities and infrastructure of the Entebbe Support Base to create the first regional service centre. The Base was established in 2006 as a regional hub (see General Assembly resolution 60/121) for common use by missions in the region

to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of logistical support operations; it is currently funded and managed by MONUC. In addition to MONUC, the Entebbe Support Base is included in the mission area of UNAMID, UNMIS, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, UNSOA and MINURCAT.

73. The establishment of Entebbe as a regional service centre will reduce the regional missions' deployment footprints, as support staff will be co-located in the regional centre. Through this approach, centres of expertise for support areas will be created, while mission footprints will prioritize the deployment of staff in the substantive areas.

74. The selection of the location of the first regional service centre was based on the following criteria: geographic location, availability of a qualified labour force, safety and security, quality of life, country infrastructure and optimization of investments.

### **C. Regional service centre — cost-benefit analysis**

75. An indicative and preliminary cost-benefit analysis has been undertaken to identify the economic impact of transferring a number of functional processes to the Entebbe Regional Service Centre. The analysis compares the operating costs for the existing functions in the missions to the cost of providing the same functions in a shared service environment.

76. The analysis focused on select routine back-office transactional and administrative processes as well as on the optimization of specialized processes that have been determined to render material benefits when consolidated at the regional service centre. The projections that resulted from the analysis are based on cost estimates for the 2010-2011 fiscal period. It is envisaged that as the regional service centre concept matures, processes will be optimally re-engineered to improve service delivery to the field.

77. The qualitative benefits of the regional service centre model include:

- (a) Improved operational transparency through:
  - (i) Standardized processes across missions;
  - (ii) Unification of systems;
  - (iii) Proximity of staff;
- (b) A reduced number of civilians stationed in hardship/hazardous locations;
- (c) Improved quality of life for civilian staff;
- (d) A reduced administrative burden throughout the entire mission life cycle, allowing missions to better focus on their substantive mandate;
- (e) Improved ability to recruit staff to more stable, less hazardous work locations;
- (f) Increased stability of operations through reduced staff turnover;
- (g) Improved service quality and consistency in the delivery of services through centres of competence;

(h) Simplified implementation of enterprise systems in the field (i.e., Umoja);

(i) Streamlined and expedited decision-making processes through the appropriate delegation of authority.

78. With respect to quantitative benefits of the regional service centre model, a summary of an indicative study undertaken to assess the costs and feasibility of savings from service centres is provided in table 1 below.

Table 1  
**Projected benefits and costs of regional service centres**  
(Thousands of United States dollars)

<b>Benefits</b>	
Back-office efficiencies	16 372
Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre	47 241
Civilian predeployment training	3 342
Network standardization and data consolidation	5 701
Disaster recovery and business continuity	3 516
Offshore software development	1 164
Regional shared resource management and warranty	9 120
<b>Total annual financial benefits</b>	<b>86 426</b>
<b>Costs</b>	
Back office	8 317
Call centre	5 134
Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre (excluding specialist system)	1 819
Other projects	1 404
<b>Total annual costs</b>	<b>16 584</b>
<b>Total annual net benefits</b>	<b>69 652</b>

79. The direct financial benefits projected and shown in the table are derived from:

(a) **Back-office efficiencies.** The transfer of back-office administrative functions from the missions to the Entebbe regional service centre will make it possible to realize economies of scale as a result of the consolidation of selected functions into a shared facility. Those benefits will be realized through:

- A head-count reduction, by applying the shared-services model. On the basis of publicly available information on shared-services implementations, a standard of 10 per cent in post reduction across missions is expected. Such a reduction will be possible owing to the elimination of redundant functions once staff has been consolidated in a single location. Process standardization and optimization, integral to regional service centre implementation, is also expected and will likely increase the reduction rate

- A reduction in the accommodation and operating infrastructure required. Commensurate with the reduction in posts, support costs, including office space, information and communications technology equipment and services, and utilities, among other things, will also be lowered
- A reduction in operating and maintenance costs at Entebbe in comparison with equivalent costs in the missions

(b) **Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre.** The implementation of the Centre, which is expected to generate significant savings through:

- Integrated movement planning, so as to optimize the use of passenger and cargo aircraft, leading to a reduction in the aircraft fleet (see table 2 below)
- Coordinated planning and usage of the wide-body long-range jet for troop rotations, leading to a reduction in the number of “empty legs” and minimizing reliance on short-term charters

Table 2  
**Expected savings from the implementation of the Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre**

<i>Type of aircraft</i>	<i>Average annual cost/aircraft (fixed and operating)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Total number of aircraft in the region</i>	<i>Likely reduction of aircraft on implementation</i>	<i>Likely cost efficiencies (annualized)<sup>a</sup></i>
Long-haul passenger (MD-83 class)	7 202 000	3	1	7 202 000
Medium-haul passenger (CRJ class)	5 805 600	8	2	11 611 200
Long-haul heavy cargo (IL-76 class)	4 187 000	5	1	4 187 000
Long-haul medium cargo (C-130/L-100 class)	7 860 000	7	2	15 720 000
Strategic heavy lift rotary wing (MI-26)	13 770 000	6	1	13 770 000
Reduction of 10 per cent in identified savings owing to higher usage (flight hour + fuel) of residual aircraft in the fleet				5 249 020
Net likely savings on implementation of phase I				47 241 180

<sup>a</sup> Thousands of United States dollars.

(c) **Civilian predeployment training.** A generic training course for all the missions is currently being conducted at the United Nations Logistics Base; it begins on a Tuesday and lasts six days (not including the 2-day weekend). Travel to and from the Base can take up to two days, resulting in an average 10-day commitment (of which 8 to 9 are workdays) to complete the training. Hosting and delivering civilian predeployment training from the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe will allow for efficiency gains in several areas and will result in material savings, as shown below:

- Per recruit: approximately \$7,400 in travel costs and \$950 in daily subsistence allowance
- Total savings in travel costs of \$2,960,000
- Total savings in daily subsistence allowance of \$380,000
- Combined total savings each year of \$3,340,000

(d) **Network standardization and data consolidation.** Currently, all five regional field missions host and operate their own data centres, which comprise more than 1,000 physical servers. An analysis of the current operational environment and practices indicated that greater efficiency was achievable through centralization, standardization, virtualization and data consolidation with respect to some components of current information technology services. The proposed solution is based on establishing the capacity required to host, operate and deliver the field application that will be used by regional service centre personnel. It is proposed that mission-critical field applications and information technology services be delivered to users operating from the regional service centre using a centralized approach, thereby allowing existing field missions' computing resources to be transferred and the cost of information technology services reduced as a result of the consolidation and harmonization of equipment. The proposed approach will not only reduce capital expenditures; it will also increase operational agility, reliability, security and quality of data as well as the overall efficiency of resource utilization. The direct savings (\$5.7 million) will be the result of a reduction of 246 physical servers, representing 22 per cent of total current server holdings in five regional missions and an additional reduction in support personnel and equipment.

(e) **Disaster recovery and business continuity.** Utilizing the regional service centre as a location for operating information and communications technology services that support the functions being transferred and optimizing disaster recovery and business continuity capacity will support further improvements in the effectiveness of recovery of operations and increase the availability of data to field missions in the region. It is expected that this proposed approach will allow for a reduction of costs (\$3.5 million) arising from two main tracks: the consolidation and transfer of those field applications that support functions to be transferred to the regional service centre and the utilization of the information and communications hub in Valencia to provide a consolidated disaster recovery and business continuity capacity.

(f) **Offshore software development.** The proposed solution is to transfer some of the existing capacity in the area of field mission development to the regional service centre so as to support the implementation of standardized field applications that directly support regional service centre functions. Such capacity will be further complemented by the use of locally recruited programmers and software engineers. It is expected that this approach will lead to a cost reduction resulting from the consolidation of development resources and infrastructure. In addition, this approach will yield the broader benefits of delivering standardized applications that meet the business requirements of field missions. Once missions have migrated to a standardized, centralized platform, the quality of mission-critical data also will be improved, allowing for global visibility of mission data and improved reporting and decision-making capacities.

Tangible direct savings will include:

- (i) A reduction in development infrastructure requirements, equipment and associated operational costs of more than 70 per cent on average, resulting in savings of approximately \$780,000;
- (ii) An estimated reduction in mission staffing requirements of 17 per cent, resulting in savings of approximately \$400,000;
- (iii) A significant reduction in the amount of time required to develop and deploy applications, as well as an increased return on investment. This will be achieved through the centralization of development resources and the use of a standardized approach based on the platform- and object-oriented development framework, whereby applications are built with reusable objects. A significant reduction in the time required to build and deploy applications for field missions is anticipated.

(g) **Regional shared resource management and warranty.** It is projected that the ability to leverage warranty repairs in Entebbe will allow missions to significantly reduce stock holdings in their respective mission stores. It is estimated that a 4 per cent decrease in total non-expendable equipment holdings is achievable. Tangible direct savings will be generated through a reduction in information and communications technology holdings of 4 per cent of total inventory, representing a realizable savings of \$9.12 million, assuming current information and communications technology inventory holdings of \$228 million.

80. To eliminate the need for duplicate management structures and optimize integration linkages to headquarters, oversight and accountability functions will be ensured through a reporting line in which the director of the global service centre will report directly to the Assistant Secretary-General for Field Support.

81. As part of the research on and cost-benefit analysis of the regional service centre, a case study of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was conducted that reviewed the performance of the Mission from its start-up to its current drawdown phase on the basis of key historical mission data in the areas of staffing, force generation, contract management, facilities/property management, deployment of strategic deployment stocks, and aircraft and transport asset management.

82. The purpose of the study was to conduct a retrospective review of UNMIL over the life cycle of the Mission to determine, hypothetically, how the existence of a regional service centre would have affected the organization, staffing and operating costs of the Mission at each stage. The study considered each area of mission support so as to identify those functions that could be transferred to the regional service centre, with a particular focus on better addressing the stage-specific challenges the Mission had faced.<sup>8</sup>

83. The conclusion of the study supports the proposal of the regional service centre model as an effective mechanism to transform the scope, design and delivery of mission support. By centralizing transferable back-office functions, UNMIL

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<sup>8</sup> Data and input was provided by the UNMIL Director of Mission Support, in coordination with the Mission Service and Section Chiefs and the Department of Field Support service centre project team at Headquarters. In addition, the end of assignment reports of senior UNMIL staff and the best practices and lessons learned study on the UNMIL start-up phase were considered.



could have achieved an estimated reduction of 128 posts (3 P-5, 9 P-4, 7 P-3, 4 P-2, 52 Field Service/General Service and 53 United Nations Volunteers) across the mission stages as follows: start-up (39), maintenance (64) and drawdown (25). This would have resulted in savings of \$58.3 million from the beginning of the mission through the end of 2008. It should be noted, however, that UNMIL would have been required to contribute to the financing of the regional service centre in an amount proportionate to its size. The amount of that contribution has not been factored into the case study, but it would have been less than the cost savings realized in the Mission.

## V. Integrated human resources framework

84. The improved field human resources management framework transforms the management of civilian capacities in field missions. It represents a shift from quantitative to qualitative efforts, with a focus on the results to be achieved by a civilian workforce comprising both internal and external capacities that is capable and adaptable and readily available for deployment when and wherever needed. It builds on the gains and achievements of past and recent efforts in the area of human resources management, from the improvements stemming from the Brahimi report in 2000, to the integration into the global Secretariat of field staff as a result of the approval by the General Assembly in its resolution 63/250 of new contractual arrangements and conditions of service for staff in the field. Most importantly, the improved field human resources management framework is aligned with the talent management system, as described in the report of the Secretary-General (A/63/285).

85. The improved field human resources management framework focuses on ensuring the predictability, adaptability, capability and timeliness of the delivery of human resources services in the field, as well as reinforced accountability. It integrates the following six core functions:

(a) **Workforce planning.** The goal is to ensure a predictable and adequate supply of capable and readily deployable external and internal civilian capacities. To ensure immediacy of response to evolving mission cycles, the process builds on analysing supply and demand, forecasting requirements, projecting future trends and identifying capacity gaps. An analysis will be made of capacity gaps to identify those areas in which external sources of human capacity can be appropriately used to supplement internal capacities, provide expertise not available from within, and/or meet rapid-deployment requirements. External capacities may be provided through military enabling units, Governments, consultants or individual contractors, commercial contractors, United Nations Volunteers, or partnerships with United Nations or other organizations. Where demands for rapid deployment at the start-up of a mission require specialized expertise not readily available internally, or where immediacy of response cannot be achieved through existing capacities, standby arrangements or service agreements with external partners for the immediate deployment of support services and specialized expertise, to be managed by the appropriate centre of expertise, will augment existing capacities to provide for a more robust response to rapid deployment requirements;

(b) **Recruitment and placement.** Critical civilian capabilities are identified and obtained up front, and rosters of capable and adaptable staff — global talent — are at the ready from within peace operations, across the United Nations Secretariat

and other United Nations system entities and from other international and national governmental and non-governmental partners and external sources. Particular emphasis will be placed on recruiting and retaining female staff so as to ensure improved gender balance at all levels;

(c) **Succession management.** This provides a framework for building the capability and adaptability of mission staff by developing talent at all levels and across functions and by ensuring the continuity of leadership and management positions through an emphasis on career paths, learning and training opportunities and strengthened staff performance and development systems. Leadership capacities across missions are enhanced and enabled, capacities at all levels of staff and functions are developed and competencies are enhanced, and increased opportunities are created for high-performing, committed and dedicated individuals;

(d) **Conditions of service.** Emphasis is placed on improving conditions of service so as to attract and retain the civilian capacities needed and to provide for staff needs and well-being, including rest and recuperation and assistance for families that remain outside non-family missions, and help to attract and retain high-calibre staff for service in difficult and hardship locations. The establishment of a regional service centre as a family duty station would create opportunities for international staff in non-family missions to serve in a location accompanied by their eligible family members. The continuing appointment for international staff in the field will carry with it an obligation to rapidly deploy to meet urgent operational needs. Incentives, within existing frameworks, for rewarding rapid deployment and prolonged service and mobility to non-family locations will also be explored;

(e) **Business intelligence.** This provides the information analysis needed to make optimal decisions about a workforce, to influence strategic direction and to more meaningfully and strategically gather and measure information on human resources activities with the goal of improving organizational performance. These tools will allow for the identification of methods that yield the highest-quality employees, or for a retention analysis that makes it possible to consolidate and monitor factors that affect turnover rates. It is also possible to conduct a workforce analysis that allows for the alignment of staff performance with the strategic goals of peace operations, as well as a succession planning analysis that allows for the identification of future leaders and promotes a decision-making process that ensures that outreach efforts are attracting suitable managers and helping to address capacity gaps;

(f) **Customer service integration and modular service delivery.** With the redesigned and central focus given to the delivery and implementation of customer services and the introduction of regional service centres, the human resources operations service delivery model at Headquarters is being realigned in terms of customer service integration so as to improve responsiveness and efficiency. These roles, together with the redefined human resources centres of expertise at Headquarters and the human resources roles already in place in field missions, constitute the building blocks of a new, modular service-delivery model that provides for greater innovation, flexibility and agility in human resources solutions.

86. The introduction of the regional service centre will allow for the greater delegation of human resources authorities to a location closer to the point of delivery to staff in the field, thus separating strategic/monitoring functions from back-office operational tasks. With regional service centres handling routine

administrative tasks such as responding to manager and employee inquiries and administering personnel transactions, it is possible for Headquarters to divest itself of “back-office” transactions that should take place on the ground and allows activities at Headquarters to focus on strategic specialties and operational issues. Roles in the area of customer service integration at Headquarters will be reprofiled as human resources business partners dedicated to a specific mission or cluster of missions, providing staff, senior and line managers with strategic operational services, and, in consultation with specialists in the strategy and standard-setting centres of expertise, will offer customized solutions to Missions’ human resources operational issues.

## **VI. Operational management system for implementation of the plan**

### **A. Operational management framework**

87. The operational management framework articulates the objectives, authority, functions, limitations and relationships required to successfully put in place the plan for change. A consultative body is to be established with the goal of integrating the support plan for field missions, including in the areas of human resources, finance, procurement, logistics, information and communications technology and other administrative and general management issues. The consultative body will integrate representatives from the Department of Field Support, enabling/implementing partners, peacekeeping and special political missions, and senior service providers.

88. To ensure adherence to management best practices, the Office of Internal Oversight Services will be briefed on a quarterly basis. Directors of the Department of Field Support will ensure alignment with the Organization’s regulations and rules in their respective areas of responsibility by engaging with their counterpart office in the Secretariat.

89. A client board composed of Department of Political Affairs and Department of Peacekeeping Operations headquarters and mission leadership (including Heads of missions and senior police and military officers) will be constituted to advise on course corrections, as required. The client board will represent stakeholders’ perspectives and be requested to evaluate programme performance and delivery.

90. Implementation coordinators will be responsible for monitoring and reporting on the implementation and its impact in the field. The programme coordinators will report to the consultative body on a monthly basis. Additional resources are required for this task.

### **B. Change management plan**

91. The strategy’s change management plan integrates two aspects, incorporating both feedback and change. It seeks to achieve the following core objectives throughout the plan’s implementation: ensuring continued senior-level guidance and involvement, and promoting an understanding among all staff (both in the field and at Headquarters) of the need for change and of the opportunities and benefits

available to staff. Training requirements for change implementation will be identified in the first phase of plan implementation (2010/11).

### **C. Quality assurance**

92. The plan must ensure the quality of existing service-delivery standards throughout its five-year implementation horizon and must deliver real improvements in the mid- to long term. To render this vision operational, mission management will play a substantive role in determining service standards and measurements for the strategy's implementation.

### **D. Risk management**

93. Working within the Secretariat-wide risk management framework, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support will issue and adopt a policy directive for risk management applicable to all managers in those Departments. The policy, which sets out an overarching approach to risk management for United Nations peacekeeping and field-based special political missions, defines risk management as coordinated activities, aimed at directing and controlling risk to the Organization. In this context, the implementation of a risk register of identified risks will be prioritized in order to capture an analysis and evaluation of risks and proposed mitigation strategies.

## **VII. Implementation**

94. The strategy provides a global support model that recognizes the need to improve service delivery to field missions while ensuring optimal stewardship of Member States' contributions to international peace and security. The four core objectives and two mission impact objectives reflect the strategy's focus. Targeted improvements in these areas of support constitute the main tools by means of which the strategy will be achieved. Assessment is fundamental, and each of the objectives will be measured through a set of established indicators.

### **A. Implementation: phase I (2010/11)**

95. In its first year of implementation, the Department of Field Support team will develop and validate with its Secretariat and mission counterparts the optimal measurement tools for determining performance in the process of achieving the objectives. That approach is designed to refocus Headquarters on its strategic oversight role while putting in place the accountability and governance frameworks necessary to enable comprehensive and detailed reporting to Member States on a regular basis. In the first year (2010/11) the following quick-impact transformation activities would be implemented:

- (a) Mounting the initial capabilities for the global and regional service centres;

(b) Improving rapid-deployment capabilities through the adoption of a service package approach that builds on existing capacities (i.e., strategic deployment stocks, systems contracts, etc.);

(c) Developing human resources systems and tools to better forecast staffing requirements, build rosters of readily deployable and fully vetted personnel and provide for a succession management framework that sets out predictable career paths and associated learning programmes;

(d) Enhancing access to financing at the earliest stages of mission approval and start-up.

## **B. Resource requirements**

96. A coherent management system is needed to buttress the leadership of the Department of Field Support in ensuring the accomplishment of the six objectives, exercising appropriate managerial oversight and reporting to different stakeholders (e.g., Member States, other departments and other organizations) in a timely and transparent manner. The goal is to allow leaders and managers to make decisions that take into consideration the different dimensions of a given problem and to effectively track and monitor the implementation of such decisions in the context of the implementation of the strategy.

97. To address the complexity of this project and to ensure the success of the strategy (which differs from previous initiatives in that it hinges on the implementation of proposals made in the context of the Brahimi reforms and thereafter), a strong management capacity is required. Such a capacity must be inextricably linked with day-to-day operations so as to render it both dynamic and directly responsive to field mission support requirements. I therefore propose to establish an implementation coordination capability within the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support.

98. This implementation coordination capacity, located both at United Nations Headquarters and on the ground in Entebbe, will be dedicated to supporting all activities related to the strategy's programme of work. These include planning, coordination and execution as well as the development of a performance management framework to support regular reporting to implementing partners and stakeholders. It is proposed that this implementation coordination capability at United Nations Headquarters be composed of a Principal Officer at the D-1 level, one Senior Programme Officer at the P-5 level, two P-4 Management Officers and one Administrative Officer at the P-3 level, and one General Service (Other level) staff member. While it is envisaged that the posts of the P-4 Management Officers, the P-3 Administrative Officer and the General Service (Other level) staff member will be accommodated through redeployments within the Department, general temporary assistance for a 12-month period is requested to fund the D-1 post for the fiscal period 2010/11. A P-5 post is requested to ensure continuity throughout the strategy's implementation horizon. These resource requests will be presented in the 2010/11 budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations.

99. The effect of these additional requests for general temporary assistance will be offset by the benefits and savings provided by the strategy. The successful implementation of the support strategy and the dedicated focus on establishing

mechanisms to ensure implementation success, control and increased transparency are projected to yield considerable long-term efficiencies and savings for the Organization.

## **VIII. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly**

100. I urge Member States to consider the following substantive and administrative actions:

(a) **Substantive action:**

Take note of the report of the Secretary-General and request the Secretary-General to proceed with the implementation of the global support strategy as a means of improving the speed, efficiency and stewardship of mission start-up and support during mission life cycles.

(b) **Administrative action:**

(i) **Endorse the concept of service centres for support delivery and approve the creation of the global service centre in Brindisi and the first regional service centre in Entebbe;**

(ii) **Request the Secretary-General to submit proposals for a pre-approved funding model for the start-up of peacekeeping operations at its sixty-fifth session;**

(iii) **Decide that, if a decision of the Security Council relating to the start-up phase or expansion phase of peacekeeping operations results in the need for expenditure, the Secretary-General is authorized, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to enter into commitments up to the available balance of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund by decision of the Security Council, and that the cumulative total of outstanding commitment authority in respect of the start-up or expansion phase of peacekeeping operations is not to exceed the total level of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund at any one time;**

(iv) **Amend the Financial Regulations of the Organization by substituting “the balance of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, and not to exceed 150 million United States dollars” in place of “50 million United States dollars” in Financial Regulation 4.6 and “50 million dollars” in Financial Regulation 4.8;**

(v) **Decide that, if a decision of the Security Council relating to the start-up phase or expansion phase of peacekeeping operations results in the need for expenditure, the Secretary-General is authorized, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to enter into commitments up to the available balance of the stores available from the Organization’s strategic deployment stocks and draw upon these, with these drawings from the stocks to be replenished only when sufficient funds are available.**